At the beginning of 2025, the Labor government looked finished:
2024 was the annus horribilis of incumbent governments around the world.
Inflation, the failed Voice referendum, and very poor performance ratings on salient issues.
A few months later, and Labor was returned to government, won a near record landslide, and the Coalition had its worst election result since the modern Liberal Party was formed.
Three research questions:
Figure 1: First preference vote shares from polling from 2022-2025. Dots represent data points from individual polls (taken from pollbludger.net), and curves are the trend lines, smoothed using GAM. Shaded areas represent 95 per cent confidence intervals. Vertical bars underneath show the probability each week would be a change point in each time series, estimated using a Bayesian change point model. This indicates that Labor’s primary vote began sliding around the time the full text of the Voice referendum was released, with the decline mostly ending when interest rates peaked, and recovering after the RBA cut the cash rate. Coalition support largely mirrored this.
Figure 2: First preference vote shares from polling from January to May, 2025. Dots represent data points from individual polls (taken from pollbludger.net), and curves are the trend lines, smoothed using GAM. Shaded areas represent 95 per cent confidence intervals, and indicate the range of possible outcomes.
Three things:
The RBA rate cut and Trump as exogenous shocks.
Campaign effects:
a. Shifting favourability.
b. Changes in perceived performance of government and opposition.
The result: a broad-based decline in Coalition support across most demographics (but in particular, middle-aged voters, women, diverse communities).
Figure 3: Net share of voters who rate political figures and parties favourably and unfavourably. Data are from Waves 1 to 6 of the RedBridge Group - Accent Research key seat track, run from February to April, 2025. Net favourability is the share who have very or somewhat favourable views of each minus the share who have very or somewhat unfavourable views. Donald Trump was not asked in the first wave of the track (marked with an asterisk).
Figure 4: Estimated first preference and two-party preferred vote shares between November 2024 and April 2025, by generation. Shaded areas represent 95 per cent confidence intervals, and indicate the range of possible outcomes. Data are from nationally representative RedBridge Group - Accent Research surveys, run from November 2024 to April 2025.
Figure 5: Estimated swings between the 2022 and 2025 Australian federal elections, by generational cohort. Data are from the 2022 and 2025 Australian Cooperative Election Surveys.
Figure 6: Estimated first preference and two-party preferred vote shares between November 2024 and April 2025, by gender. Shaded areas represent 95 per cent confidence intervals, and indicate the range of possible outcomes. Data are from nationally representative RedBridge Group - Accent Research surveys, run from November 2024 to April 2025.
Figure 7: Estimated swings between the 2022 and 2025 Australian federal elections, by gender. Data are from the 2022 and 2025 Australian Cooperative Election Surveys.
Figure 8: Estimated first preference and two-party preferred vote shares between November 2024 and April 2025, by language. Shaded areas represent 95 per cent confidence intervals, and indicate the range of possible outcomes. Data are from nationally representative RedBridge Group - Accent Research surveys, run from November 2024 to April 2025.
Figure 9: Estimated swings between the 2022 and 2025 Australian federal elections, by language spoken at home. Data are from the 2022 and 2025 Australian Cooperative Election Surveys.
Figure 10: In 2025, Labor had the 2nd lowest winning primary vote in history (or at least since 1910). The lowest was when Labor won in 2022. Data are from the Australian Electoral Commission.
Figure 11: First preference vote share by party at Australian federal elections between 1949-2025. Data are from the Australian Electoral Commission.
Figure 12: Share of seats won by minor parties and independents in the House of Representatives at each Australian federal election between 1949 and 2025.
Figure 13: Some of this shift is driven by an increase in support for minor parties and independents by younger generational cohorts. Each generation is more likely to vote for these other parties and candidates (and less likely to support major parties) than preceding generations. Data are from the ANPAS and AES surveys, 1967-2022.
Figure 14: These patterns are not merely an artefact of the AES, either. Primary vote share of minor parties and independents by generational cohort at recent elections. Data are from the Australian Cooperative Election Surveys, 2019-2025.
Figure 15: The election outcome that voters believe will be the best result for Australia. Responses are organised by whether they prefer a majority Labor or Coalition government, or instead a minority government or some other outcome. They are shaded by the specific outcome preferred. Data are from nationally representative RedBridge Group - Accent Research surveys, run at the start and end of the 2025 Australian federal election campaign.
Figure 16: Share of voters who believe an outcome other than a majority Labor or Coalition government is a better outcome for Australia, by generational cohort. Data are from nationally representative RedBridge Group - Accent Research surveys, run at the start and end of the 2025 Australian federal election campaign.
A centre-left landslide, and ongoing party fragmentation
An Accent Research Presentation
Prepared by Shaun Ratcliff